Abstract
The 2024 Indian general election and the subsequent India-Pakistan military escalation in May 2025 exposed the scale and sophistication of information warfare in the world's largest democracy. This article examines the growing threat of coordinated disinformation campaigns—including the use of fake accounts, doctored media, and AI-generated content—and the institutional responses that have emerged to counter them. Drawing on parliamentary committee reports, government initiatives, academic research, and case studies from recent elections and conflicts, the article analyses the effectiveness of fact-checking units, the role of social media monitoring, and the regulatory framework governing takedowns. It argues that while India has developed significant institutional capacity for monitoring and rapid response, including police-run fact-checking initiatives and AI-powered surveillance tools, the country's information ecosystem remains vulnerable to disinformation due to linguistic fragmentation, political polarisation, and the sheer velocity of viral content. The article concludes by identifying the need for a comprehensive strategy that combines technological capability, regulatory reform, and public media literacy to safeguard democratic deliberation.
Keywords: misinformation, disinformation, India, social media monitoring, fact-checking, information warfare, Operation Sindoor
1. Introduction
In the digital age, rumours sprint while the truth limps behind. A WhatsApp forward warning of a bombing, a tweet screaming about civil unrest, a doctored video of a political leader—within moments, it is everywhere: on Facebook timelines, Telegram groups, and family chats . Only later, when someone bothers to verify, does the illusion crumble. The footage was never from the place claimed; it came from another country, or another year, stitched together with fresh captions and a familiar intent: to mislead, to divide, to stir fear.
This is not random rumour-mongering. It is a coordinated campaign of disinformation, meticulously engineered to shape public perception and create national unease. The digital battlefield has become one of perception, where misinformation serves as a modern weapon of influence . The 2024 Indian general election, followed by the India-Pakistan military escalation in May 2025, demonstrated that India is not merely a passive victim of this phenomenon but an active arena where information warfare is conducted with increasing sophistication.
This article examines the landscape of misinformation in India, the institutional responses that have emerged, and the challenges that remain. It draws on parliamentary committee reports, government initiatives, academic research, and case studies from recent elections and conflicts. The argument is straightforward: while India has developed significant institutional capacity for monitoring and rapid response, the country's information ecosystem remains vulnerable due to linguistic fragmentation, political polarisation, and the velocity of viral content. A comprehensive strategy combining technological capability, regulatory reform, and public media literacy is essential.
2. The Scale of the Problem: Misinformation in Indian Elections
2.1 The 2024 General Election: A Watershed Moment
The 2024 Indian general election, conducted in seven phases between April and June, witnessed an unprecedented wave of misinformation. BOOM, a leading Indian fact-checking organisation, analysed 258 election-related fact-checks between March and May 2024 . The findings reveal the scale and diversity of the problem.
Of these 258 fact-checks, 43% involved old and unrelated videos and images being falsely presented as recent . This recycling of content is a hallmark of disinformation campaigns: footage from completely different events, sometimes years old, is repurposed with new captions to serve immediate political purposes. A video of a man removing voting slips from a VVPAT machine, which had been debunked in December 2022, resurfaced during the 2024 elections with a false claim that it showed BJP workers engaging in booth capturing in Manipur .
The study also identified 12 AI-generated fact-checks, including three deepfakes and nine voice clones . AI-generated content targeted political figures across the spectrum: Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Rahul Gandhi, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, and others. Celebrities like Aamir Khan and Ranveer Singh were also targeted, with fake videos of them criticising the prime minister and endorsing Congress going viral .
Communal content was another significant category. BOOM published 10 fact-checks with communal undertones, nine of which directly targeted the Muslim community or accused the Congress party of appeasing Muslims . Prime Minister Modi himself was the source of misleading information in at least three instances, all with communal undertones—misquoting former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, spreading misleading information about the Congress manifesto, and denying that he had referred to Muslims as "infiltrators" .
A thematic analysis of mis/disinformation debunked by two fact-checking initiatives—Alt News (private) and PIB Fact Check (government)—identified six major thematic categories, including communal narratives, doctored media, and misleading claims about political opponents . The study also revealed differences in focus: while Alt News debunked content targeting both government and opposition, PIB Fact Check primarily focused on misinformation that threatened the government's narrative.
2.2 Operation Sindoor and the Information War with Pakistan
The India-Pakistan military escalation in May 2025, codenamed Operation Sindoor by India, exposed the full spectrum of information warfare tactics. According to Pakistan's Dawn newspaper, India entered the information war with every structural advantage: a multi-decade disinformation influence operation documented by international watchdogs, an organised online nationalist ecosystem, and a decade of nationalist momentum .
Yet the outcome was far from what India had anticipated. Pakistan's netizens turned the odds in their favour, winning the narrative battle through a combination of self-deprecatory humour, diplomatic trolling, and a refusal to play India's game . The international press, the foreign policy community, and the undecided global gallery—none of these were India's target. India's digital ecosystem was calibrated for a domestic audience already marinated in nationalist media. The claims did not need to be accurate, just emotionally satisfying to people watching from Mumbai and Delhi .
The specifics are worth cataloguing. Zee News announced India had captured Islamabad and Pakistan surrendered. Times Now Navbharat declared Indian forces had entered Pakistan. Aaj Tak aired footage from the January 2025 Philadelphia plane crash as an Indian airstrike on Karachi. A retired major "reported" that the Indian Navy had bombed Karachi's port—a claim met in real time by a Pakistani journalist filing from a restaurant beside the allegedly destroyed waterfront, eating shrimp karahi .
An analysis by the Strategic Vision Institute, a Pakistani think tank, documented how Hindutva-aligned accounts circulated fabricated claims to inflate hyper-masculine narratives demanding retribution. Most of these accounts recycled unrelated videos—such as Israeli airstrikes in Gaza or Iranian missile attacks on Israel—captioned misleadingly as "Indian strikes on Pakistani terror bases" . The proliferation of falsehoods was systematic and strategic.
Perhaps most damaging was India's own media infrastructure. According to BOOM Live, 68% of all fact-checks conducted in May 2025 were related to Operation Sindoor. In a country of 1.4 billion people, with a media ecosystem covering every subject imaginable, two-thirds of all verifiable falsehoods circulating in that month were about one four-day military operation . India's information war was not undermined by Pakistan. It was undermined by its own media infrastructure, operating at full speed in the wrong direction.
3. Institutional Responses: Fact-Checking, Monitoring, and Takedowns
3.1 The Press Information Bureau Fact Check Unit
The Press Information Bureau's Fact Check Unit (PIB-FCU) has emerged as the central government institution for countering misinformation. Established in 2019, its mandate is to provide the official or authentic version of any news doing the rounds on various media platforms by making available factually correct information in the public domain .
A parliamentary standing committee on communications and information technology, led by BJP MP Nishikant Dubey, recently recommended strengthening the PIB-FCU. The committee recommended enhancing its technological capabilities, "including the use of artificial intelligence tools for real-time monitoring of misinformation trends," and improved coordination with social media platforms to facilitate faster identification and removal of misleading content .
During Operation Sindoor, the PIB-FCU worked "round the clock to curb fake news, quickly detected and issued swift rebuttals to edited videos, misinformation, and propaganda, and around 1,400 URLs were blocked" . The committee recommended that the FCU's capacity be expanded with quantifiable targets, including trained personnel for regional languages and quarterly transparency reports .
However, the effectiveness of the PIB-FCU is limited by ongoing legal challenges. The Supreme Court has refused to stay the Bombay High Court's decision striking down the notification responsible for the setting up of the controversial FCU. The central Fact Check Unit, which falls under the Information Technology Act, remains under judicial review, while the PIB-FCU continues to function . This legal uncertainty creates a challenging environment for institutionalising the government's fact-checking efforts.
3.2 UP Police Fact Check: A Pioneering Initiative
Uttar Pradesh Police has developed one of the most comprehensive police-run fact-checking initiatives in India. Launched in 2017 as a proactive response to the rising threat of misinformation on social media, the initiative has earned national recognition, winning two accolades at the Economic Times GovTech Awards 2026 .
The force introduced @UPPViralCheck on X (formerly Twitter), marking India's first police-run fact-checking platform. Its mandate includes tracking viral content, verifying claims, and issuing timely rebuttals to prevent misinformation from disrupting public order. The initiative was expanded in July 2022 with the launch of @UPPFactCheck on Facebook and Instagram .
At the core of the system is a 24×7 Fact Check Desk at the UPP headquarters, which monitors content across major platforms including X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and WhatsApp. The verification process uses OSINT tools, reverse image searches, geolocation analysis, and metadata examination, supported by real-time coordination with district police units .
The initiative has demonstrated significant impact. The @UPPViralCheck handle has recorded around 3.71 million impressions and issued over 236 fact-check rebuttals. Across all 75 districts, police units have issued approximately 4,100 clarifications, while 318 FIRs have been registered against individuals involved in spreading misinformation between December 2017 and February 2026 .
During Maha Kumbh 2025, coordinated attempts were made to circulate old and unrelated videos of stampedes, falsely linking them to the Prayagraj event. The intent was to create panic and damage the state's image. The UP Police Fact Check unit identified 204 suspicious accounts and initiated action, leading to the registration of 14 criminal cases . Timely intervention helped prevent panic, communal tension, and reputational damage.
3.3 Social Media Monitoring: Government Initiatives
The Indian government has increasingly turned to technology to monitor social media. Karnataka has approved the implementation of an AI-driven Social Media Analytics Solution (SMAS) at an estimated cost of Rs 67.20 crore . The system will monitor social media platforms, websites, and other digital communication channels in real time to detect fake news, hate speech, misleading content, online abuse, cyber threats, and harmful narratives .
Minister HK Patil stated that the system would also track online recruitment efforts by terror outfits . When asked whether the law permits the government to scan social media posts, Patil said there is "absolutely no bar" on screening or verifying content in cases involving manipulation or criminal intent . The move comes amid concerns that the rapid growth of digital content has outpaced traditional monitoring mechanisms.
3.4 Takedown Mechanisms: The Three-Hour Deadline
India has tightened its enforcement stance on online platforms by directing social media companies to remove unlawful content within three hours of receiving official orders . The directive, issued under existing information technology and intermediary rules, significantly shortens the response window for platforms when authorities flag content linked to public order, national security, or other violations of law .
The three-hour deadline reflects the government's view that harmful content can spread rapidly and cause real-world consequences if not addressed immediately. Officials argue that the move is aimed at preventing the viral spread of misinformation, inflammatory posts, and content that could incite violence .
For social media firms, the order raises the compliance bar. Companies will need to maintain round-the-clock monitoring teams and faster internal escalation processes to meet the deadline. While most large platforms already have systems in place to respond to government requests, the compressed timeframe leaves little room for internal review, especially in complex cases involving legal interpretation or cross-border decision-making .
Critics have raised concerns about the potential impact on free expression and due process. Civil liberties advocates argue that such short deadlines may encourage platforms to err on the side of over-compliance, removing content quickly without sufficient assessment. "The government, for its part, though maintains that the measure is necessary to keep pace with the speed of online harm and to ensure that lawful orders are not rendered ineffective by delays, the penal provisions can be grossly misused," noted one online communication professional .
4. The Role of Fact-Checkers: Gatekeepers in the Digital Age
4.1 The Challenges of Fact-Checking in India
Academic research on fact-checking during the 2024 Indian general election reveals the complex challenges facing fact-checkers in India . A study published in Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly examined how Indian fact-checkers acted as "retroactive gatekeepers"—intervening after misinformation had already gone viral .
Drawing on semi-structured interviews with fact-checkers from six organisations and ethnographic observation within one fact-checking newsroom, the study found that fact-checkers prioritised claims based on virality, emotional salience, and harm potential, while navigating political polarisation and informal editorial structures . Multilingualism emerged as both a logistical hurdle and a disinformation amplifier, with fact-checkers relying on informal networks to bridge gaps .
The study also found that while AI detection tools are available, practitioners preferred manual verification due to reliability concerns in vernacular settings . This reliance on human verification, while ensuring accuracy, limits the speed and scale of fact-checking.
Audiences were reconceptualised as collaborators, with participatory tip lines and mobile-optimised literacy materials used to build trust and reach . This participatory approach reflects the reality that fact-checkers cannot cover the vast landscape of misinformation alone; they need the public's help in identifying and reporting suspicious content.
4.2 The Limits of Fact-Checking
Despite the efforts of fact-checkers, misinformation continues to spread. The study found that fact-checkers face significant constraints: language diversity, infrastructural asymmetries, and platform algorithms all influence verification routines, editorial decisions, and audience engagement .
One of the most significant challenges is timing. By the time a fact-check is published, the misinformation has often already gone viral. This "retroactive" nature of gatekeeping means that fact-checkers are often playing catch-up rather than preventing harm. The study expands gatekeeping theory by foregrounding the reactive, participatory, and context-specific nature of fact-checking in the Global South .
Moreover, fact-checkers operate in a highly polarised political environment. The same study noted that fact-checkers face pressure from political actors and their supporters, who may accuse them of bias. This is particularly acute for government fact-checkers like the PIB-FCU, which has been accused of being a propaganda tool rather than an impartial fact-checker .
5. The Way Forward: Strategy and Reform
5.1 Technological Capability and Infrastructure
India must marry cutting-edge technology and robust public infrastructure with a society trained to question, verify, and act on reliable information . This requires investment in natural language processing (NLP) capabilities that can train on a spectrum of languages, dialects, and socio-cultural cues . As one commentator noted, Indian AI models could be used to "speak inside the adversary's head, fracturing morale and redirecting attention long before any kinetic move is made" .
The government and platforms should plan in peacetime to create trusted information repositories, much as they did during COVID-19. Platform-originated feeds carrying verified advisories would have quelled the conflict-time rumours that briefly sparked panic .
5.2 Media Literacy and Public Education
Large-scale media literacy drives should flip India's instinctive "trust, then verify" mindset to "verify, then trust," especially among users who see digital content as inherently authoritative . This requires beginning in schools and continuing through public awareness campaigns.
Pakistan's experience during Operation Sindoor offers a cautionary tale for India. While India's media ecosystem was amplifying false claims, Pakistan's netizens were deploying self-deprecatory humour that neutralised India's attempts at humiliation . The lesson is that a digitally literate citizenry can disarm propaganda faster than any algorithm .
5.3 Regulatory Reform
The parliamentary standing committee has recommended the formulation of a comprehensive regulatory framework to address misinformation and harmful content, coordinating with other ministries to close regulatory gaps, and developing a structured grievance redressal mechanism for online and OTT content .
However, regulatory reform must balance the need for rapid response with the protection of free expression. The three-hour takedown mandate, while addressing the urgency of content moderation, raises concerns about due process and over-compliance . A more nuanced approach, perhaps distinguishing between different types of content and providing clear avenues for appeal, would be preferable.
5.4 International Cooperation
Information warfare does not respect borders. India should rally around like-minded capitals to draft a military code of conduct—setting red lines for deepfake use during peacetime . The Quad leaders' May 2023 statement backing "high-quality underwater cable networks" across the region points to the importance of securing the infrastructure that carries information .
6. Conclusion
The 2024 Indian general election and the subsequent India-Pakistan military escalation revealed the scale and sophistication of information warfare in the digital age. India's information ecosystem is vulnerable to coordinated disinformation campaigns that leverage fake accounts, doctored media, and AI-generated content to manufacture political narratives and create national unease.
India has developed significant institutional capacity for monitoring and rapid response. The PIB-FCU, UP Police Fact Check, and various state-level initiatives demonstrate the government's commitment to countering misinformation. The three-hour takedown deadline and AI-powered monitoring tools represent a toughening of the regulatory stance.
Yet these efforts face significant challenges. Linguistic fragmentation, political polarisation, and the velocity of viral content make fact-checking a perpetual game of catch-up. The experience of Operation Sindoor demonstrates that even the most well-resourced information machine can be undermined by its own media ecosystem and the strategic use of humour by adversaries.
The way forward requires a comprehensive strategy that combines technological capability, regulatory reform, and public media literacy. India must invest in AI tools that can monitor misinformation across languages and platforms, while ensuring that these tools are not abused for political censorship. A digitally literate citizenry, trained to verify before trusting, is India's most powerful defence against the weaponisation of information.
The challenge is formidable. But it is not insurmountable. Truth, in the digital age, is not a passive ideal—it is a strategic defence that requires constant vigilance, institutional capacity, and public engagement.
References
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